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Rent-sharing by workers can reduce the incentives for investment if some of the returns to sunk
capital are captured in higher wages. We propose a simple measure of this “holdup” effect based on the
size of the wage offset for firm-specific capital accumulation. Using Social Security earnings records for
workers in the Veneto region of Italy linked to detailed financial data for their employers, we find strong
evidence of rent-sharing, with an elasticity of wages with respect to potential rents per worker of around
4%, arising mainly at larger firms with higher price-cost margins. On the other hand, we find little evidence
that bargaining lowers the return on investment. Instead, firm-level bargaining appears to split the rents
after deducting the full cost of capital.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Do workers capture some of the rents earned by their employers? If so, does rent-sharing reduce
investment by imposing a tax on sunk capital? Both questions have drawn much attention
from economists.1 Decades of research using industry and firm-level data have found a positive
correlation between profitability and wages.2 Van Reenen (1996) showed that average wages at a
1. Rent-sharing is discussed in Adam Smith (1976, Book I, Chapter 8). Simons (1944) argued that rent-sharing
hurts investment, writing: “I can see no reason why strongly organized workers, in an industry where huge investment is
already sunk in highly durable assets, should ever permit a return on investment sufficient to attract new capital.”
2. Industry-level studies include Slichter (1950) and Dickens and Katz (1987). Firm-levels studies include Nickell
and Wadhwani (1990), Christofides and Oswald (1992), Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Blanchflower et al. (1996), and
Hildreth and Oswald (1997).
1
 The Review of Economic Studies Advance Access published October 1, 2013
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at U
niversity of Torino on O
ctober 11, 2013
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
[15:13 24/9/2013 rdt030.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 2 1–28
2 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
firm rise following a successful innovation, suggesting that at least part of the correlation is causal.
Recent studies that compare individual wages over time on the same job also find significant
correlations with changes in profitability (e.g., Guiso, et al. 2005; Arai and Heyman, 2009;
Guertzgen, 2009; Martins, 2009). Whether rent-sharing inhibits investment, however, depends
on the structure of bargaining and the irreversibility of capital. Grout (1984) showed that when
long-term contracts are infeasible and capital is sunk, rent-sharing leads to under-investment. A
number of analysts have argued that this “holdup” effect causes unionized firms to under-invest
relative to their non-union competitors.3
In this article, we present new evidence on the extent of holdup in wage bargaining using
matched employer–employee data from Italy. Starting from a simple model, we show that the
distortionary effect of rent-sharing depends on the fraction of capital costs that a firm can recoup
before splitting rents with its employees. With rent-sharing but no holdup, negotiated wages
contain an offset for the full cost of capital. When some of the returns to sunk investments
are captured by workers, however, the deduction for capital is smaller. Our empirical approach
therefore focuses on the magnitude of the wage offset for firm-specific capital accumulation. To
the best of knowledge, we are the first to attempt to measure the degree of holdup in this way.
We implement this approach using longitudinal Social Security earnings data for workers
in the Veneto region of Italy, combined with detailed financial data for firms. Our econometric
models relate the wages earned by individual workers to measures of value added and capital at
their current employer and an estimate of wages that could be earned in other jobs. Our preferred
specifications include job match effects (i.e., dummies for each worker-firm pair) that control
for unobserved ability differences between workers and unmeasured productivity differences
among firms, though we also estimate specifications with only observable controls for worker
productivity, and other models that include firm effects rather than job-match effects.
An important concern for our estimation strategy is the presence of transitory fluctuations
in measured value added which will lead to downward bias in the estimated degree of rent-
sharing, particularly in models that control for match effects. We use the revenues of firms in
the same narrowly defined industry in other regions of Italy to construct an instrumental variable
for the value added of Veneto employers. Our identifying assumption is that industry-specific
demand shocks affect firm-level profitability but have no direct effect on local labour supply. We
validate this assumption by comparing results with and without data from specialized firms in
the Industrial Districts of Veneto, where the feedback effects from industry-specific shocks are
likely to be largest.
Our empirical findings point to two main conclusions. First, increases in firm-specific
profitability lead to significant increases in wages for a typical firm in our sample. In cross-
sectional models, the estimated elasticity of wages with respect to quasi-rents per worker is on
the order of 6–10%. Within-job-spell estimates derived from our instrumental variables approach
are smaller (around 4–5%) but still significant, suggesting that the simple correlation between
wages and profitability reflects both ability sorting and rent-sharing. The elasticity of wages with
respect to quasi-rents is bigger for larger firms, firms with greater market power, and firms with
a higher likelihood of a firm-specific union contract.
Second, we find that wages are significantly negatively related to capital per worker. Indeed,
the point estimates from a variety of alternative specifications are consistent with full offset of
capital costs and a user cost of capital of around 10%—a value that is close to estimates of the
3. Studies showing a negative effect of unionization on investment include Connolly et al. (1986), Hirsch (2004),
Denny and Nickell (1992), Bronars and Deere (1993), Odgers and Betts (1997), and Cardullo et al. (2013). Machin and
Wadhwani (1991) find no significant effect. Likewise Addison et al. (2007) find no effect of works councils on investment
by German firms.
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user cost for firms in Italy during our sample period (e.g., Gaiotti and Generale, 2001; Gennari
et al., 2005). These findings appear to be robust to a wide range of functional form and sample
selection choices, though the precision of our estimates does not allow us to rule out some degree
of holdup.
2. A SIMPLE MODEL OF RENT-SHARING AND WAGE DETERMINATION
2.1. Model setup
This section presents a simple two-period bargaining model between a firm and a homogeneous
group of workers. We use the model to show how bargaining in a sequence of short-term contracts
can lead to holdup when capital accumulation takes time and investments are irreversible. We then
show how holdup is reduced when in-progress investments are easier to liquidate than completed
capital, and discuss other mechanisms that might mitigate holdup, including “efficient” bargaining
between firms and workers (as in Crawford, 1988). Finally, we develop an empirical measure of
holdup based on the relationship between wages, value added per worker, and capital per worker.
For simplicity, we assume that employment is fixed and that firms lease their capital stock
period-by-period, but face a 1 period delay between the point they select the capital stock and
when it is ready for use.4 The timing is as follows: The game begins in period 1 with some
predetermined capital stock K1. The firm then chooses a capital stock K2 for period 2. Following
this decision the parties bargain over the wage for period 1, w1. If no agreement is reached,
the game ends and each party receives their outside option. If agreement is reached, workers
receive w1, the firm earns profits 1(w1), and the game proceeds to period 2. At this point, the
only decision variable is w2, which is again determined by bargaining. If agreement is reached
workers receive w2 and the firm receives 2(w2). If not, the game ends and the parties receive
their outside options.
Profits in each period depend on net revenues Rt(Kt) minus the costs of labour and capital:
t(wt)=Rt(Kt)−wtL−rtKt,
where Rt(Kt) = R(Kt, t) varies with a revenue shock t known at least one period in advance,
L is the level of employment, and rt is the user cost of capital. We assume that workers’ payoffs
are proportional to the excess wage bill:
ut(wt)= (wt−mt)L,
where mt is a measure of the alternative wage in period t.5 With these preferences, wages act as
a pure transfer between the parties and the sum of their payoffs is:
St =u(wt)+(wt)=Rt(Kt)−mtL−rtKt,
which does not depend on wt. Finally, we assume that the parties discount the future at a common
discount factor .
To complete the model, we need to specify the outside options of the parties. We assume that
in the event of impasse the firm liquidates its existing capital and any in-progress investments. We
4. In an earlier version of this article (Card et al., 2010), we present a model with variable employment and show
that it yields similar predictions.
5. See Farber (1986) for a discussion of the collective preferences of workers. With fixed employment and identical
workers, this objective is consistent with each worker having a linear within-period utility of income.
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assume that a fraction of installed capital can be liquidated, yielding a payoff of0t =−(1−)rtKt
if bargaining fails.6 Given that K2 is determined before wage bargaining in period 1, we also need
to specify what happens to second period capital in the event of no agreement in the first period. We
assume that a fraction 1− of in-progress investments can be costlessly abandoned. The liability
for second period capital if the firm closes down in period 1 is therefore 02 =−(1−)r2K2.
Finally, we assume that in the absence of agreement each worker earns the alternative wage mt,
implying that u0t =0.
Working backward, we assume that second-period bargaining maximizes a generalized Nash
objective:
[u2(w2)−u02][2(w2)−02]1− (1)
where ∈[0,1] represents the relative bargaining power of workers. The optimal wage w∗2 splits
the gains from trade, implying:
u2(w∗2)−u02 =Q2 and
2(w∗2)−02 = (1−) Q2,
where
Q2 ≡u2(w∗2)+2(w∗2)−u02−02 =S2−u02−02
is the “quasi-rent” associated with reaching agreement. Given our assumptions:
Q2 =R2(K2)−m2L−r2K2, (2a)
w∗2 =m2+Q2/L, (2b)
2(w∗2)= (1−)[R2(K2)−m2L]−(1−)r2K2. (2c)
When capital is fully liquid, =1 and the quasi-rent expression in equation (2) deducts the full
cost of capital (r2K2). When some fraction of capital is illiquid, however, the quasi rent is higher
and the deduction is smaller. Differentiating 2 with respect to K2 yields:
∂2/∂K2 = (1−)[∂R2/∂K2−r2], (3)
where
=1+/(1−)·(1−)≥1
reflects the net cost of capital, taking account of “tax” imposed by rent-sharing. If the firm
were to choose K2 in period 1 to maximize second-period profits, this condition would imply
under-investment whenever <1 (see Grout, 1984 for a very similar expression).
When capital accumulation takes time and on-going investments are easier to liquidate than
fully installed capital, however, some of the potential holdup of the second-period capital stock
can be offset by lower wages in period 1. Intuitively, the firm can use the threat of abandoning
planned investment to extract wage concessions from workers. Consider the bargaining game in
the first period, after K2 has been selected by the firm. Taking account of the continuing value
6. Alternatively, the penalty for ending the capital lease early is (1−) per unit. A similar assumption is made by
Grout (1984).
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of the relationship, the payoff to workers of a wage w1 is u1(w1) + u2(w∗2), while the payoff to
the firm is 1(w1)+2(w∗2). Bargaining in period 1 therefore maximizes:
[u1(w1)+u2(w∗2)− u˜01][1(w1)+2(w∗2)−˜01]1−,
where u˜01 and ˜01 represent the outside options if there is no agreement in period 1. Given our
assumptions, u˜01 =0 and
˜01 =01+02 =−(1−)r1K1−(1−)r2K2.
The total quasi-rent Q˜1 associated with reaching an agreement in period 1 is therefore
Q˜1 =u1(w∗1)+1(w∗1)−01+(u2(w∗2)+2(w∗2)−02)
=S1+S2−01−02.
The optimal first period wage sets:
u1(w∗1)+u2(w∗2)=Q˜1 (4a)
1(w∗1)+2(w∗2)= (1−)Q˜1+˜01. (4b)
Substituting u2(w∗2)=Q2 and using the fact that Q2 = S2−02 leads to a first period wage of:
w∗1 =m1+Q1/L, (5)
where
Q1 =S1−01+(1−)02
=R1(K1)−m1L−r1K1−(1−)(1−)r2K2
is the “effective” quasi-rent in period 1, taking account of the value of the continuing relationship.
When <1, Q1 contains an offset for the sunk component of K2 that is held up in bargaining
in period 2. In fact, when =0 the offset is just the (discounted) amount 02 that is added to the
quasi-rent in period 2 as a result of the irreversibility of capital.
This offset helps to re-align the firm’s incentive for investment in period 2. In particular, using
equation (4b) the firm’s discounted profits can be written as
1(w∗1)+2(w∗2)= (1−)(S1+S2)+01+02.
The firm chooses K2 prior to bargaining in period 1 to maximize the sum of first- and second-period
profits, leading to the first-order condition:
∂[1(w∗1)+2(w∗2)]/∂K2 = (1−)[∂R2/∂K2−r2]=0, (6)
where
=1+/(1−)·h∗ ≥1,
and h∗ =(1−) is an index of capital illiquidity. If in-progress investments are no easier to
liquidate than installed capital, =1 and the value of  is the same as in equation (3). When
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firms can more easily halt planned investments, however, <1, and the degree of holdup is
reduced. We suspect this mechanism may be relevant in our empirical setting, since many Veneto
firms began out-sourcing production to Eastern Europe during the 1990s (see e.g., Mariotti and
Montagnana, 2008). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the threat of diverting new investment to
offshore plants was used by firms to win wage concessions.
A number of other channels could also influence the degree of holdup (see Menezes-Filho
and Van Reenen, 2003 for a related discussion). One possibility, analysed by Crawford (1988), is
that w1 and K2 are jointly determined in first-period bargaining. Under this “efficient bargaining”
assumption, there is no distortionary effect on investment: the wage in period 1 includes a complete
offset for any holdup in period 2 regardless of the value of .7 A second possibility is that
firms use debt financing to mitigate holdup (e.g., Baldwin, 1983; Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993;
Subramaniam, 1996). Assuming that debt holders have to be fully repaid if bargaining fails,
this strategy can undo the effect of sunk capital.8 Finally, in a richer model of product market
interactions between competing firms, rent-sharing need not reduce investment. Ulph and Ulph
(1989, 1994) consider a tournament style model of investment with variable employment and
show that when workers bargain over employment and wages with the firm (but not investment),
rent-sharing leads to an increase in investment.9
2.2. Implications for estimating the degree of holdup
The impact of rent-sharing on investment depends on the fraction of capital costs that are deducted
prior to distributing the rents from bargaining. Specifically, equation (5) implies that in an ongoing
relationship the negotiated wage in period t will depend on the alternative wage, revenues, and
current and future capital costs:
wt =mt(1−)+Rt(Kt)/L−[rtKt+(1−)(1−)rt+1Kt+1]/L. (5’)
Assume that the cost of capital is approximately constant for a given firm (though potentially
different for different firms), and let rt = rt+1 = r.10 Assume in addition that the capital stock per
worker is approximately a random walk, so we can write:
Kt+1 =Kt+	t+1,
where 	t+1 represents a shock to the net capital stock. Substituting into the wage equation above
and simplifying, we obtain:
wt =mt(1−)+Rt(Kt)/L−r(1−h)(Kt/L)+εt (7)
where h = (1−)+(1−)(1−)(1−)≈ h∗, the index of capital illiquidity from equation (6),
and εt is a linear function of 	t+1. Treating the final term as a residual component, this model has
two main implications. First, controlling for net revenues per worker, higher capital per worker
7. Under joint bargaining over second period capital and the first period wage, the Nash bargain will maximize
the joint surplus, leading to an efficient choice for K2.
8. As noted by Usman (2004), the implicit assumption is that renegotiation with creditors is not possible in the
event of no agreement.
9. Menezes-Filho et al. (1998) find empirical support for this prediction.
10. When it takes n periods to install new capital, the offset term in equation (5’) will extend forward n periods,
and we can think of r as the average user cost over this time horizon.
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has a negative effect on wages. Second, the ratio of the coefficient of capital per worker to the
corresponding coefficient of net revenue per worker is r(1 – h), where h = 0 if there is no holdup,
and h = 1 if there is complete holdup. Given a value for r, we can infer the size of the holdup
distortion in investment from this ratio, though we cannot separately identify  and .
Importantly, equation (7) is also valid under several alternative bargaining models. For
example, ignoring the potentially lower cost of liquidating in-progress investments leads to a
variant of equation (5’) with no future capital cost component. In this case, (7) is valid with
h = (1−). Alternatively, if workers and firms bargain jointly over wages and future capital, or if
firms voluntarily share rents with workers, then (7) is correctly specified with h = 0. Equation (7)
therefore provides a convenient empirical model for assessing the degree of holdup regardless of
the specific bargaining model.
For our main estimates we adopt a log-linearization of equation (7). Specifically, building
on the observation that year effects and many other covariates (e.g., job tenure) exert a roughly
proportional effect on wages, we assume that rent-sharing results in a proportional premium:
log(wit)= log(mit)b1+Xitb2+VAj(i,t),tb3+KLj(i,t),tb4+it, (8)
where wit is the average daily wage earned by worker i in year t, mit is a measure of the
opportunity wage, Xit represents a vector of measured characteristics of the worker, VAj(i,t),t
represents measured value added per worker at the firm j(i,t) that employed worker i in period t,
KLj(i,t),t is measured capital per worker at the firm, and it is an error term. Our focus is on the
ratio b4/b3, which provides an estimate of r(1 – h) . Comparing this ratio to a benchmark value of
r provides an estimate of the illiquidity index h. We fit equation (8) using a variety of estimation
strategies, and report on alternative functional forms to confirm the robustness of our findings.
Rather than attempt to derive our own estimate of the user cost of capital (r), we rely on
two studies that estimate costs for a broad set of Italian firms in the 1990s: Gaiotti and Generale
(2001) and Gennari et al. (2005). Both studies use financial information from the same underlying
source as our data (described below), and both include relatively small firms (e.g., the median
size of firms in Gennari, Maurizi, and Staderini is 66 employees, which is comparable to the
firms in our sample). Gennari et al. (2005) estimate that the user cost varied from 6.5% to 12%
during our sample period (1995–2001), while Gaiotti and Generale (2001) present slightly higher
estimates (9%–14%) for the period from 1995 to 1999.11 Based on this evidence we conclude
that a reasonable value for r is in the range of 10%–12%.
3. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND, DATA SOURCES,
AND DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW
3.1. Institutional background
Wage setting in Italy is governed by a “two-level” bargaining system (see Casadio, 2003, and
Dell’Aringa and Lucifora, 1994). Sectoral agreements (typically negotiated every two years)
establish contractual minimum wages for different occupation classes that are automatically
extended to all employees in the industry. Unions can also negotiate firm-specific contracts that
provide additional wage premiums. During the mid-1990s, about 40% of private sector employees
were covered by firm-level contracts (ISTAT, 2000). In addition, individual employees receive
premiums and bonuses that add to the minimum contractual wage covering their job.
11. Other studies that estimate the user cost of capital include Arachi and Biagi (2005), who report estimates in the
range from 12.5% to 14.5% for manufacturing firms during 1995–1997, and Elston and Rondi (2006), who study listed
firms and report a median user cost of 11% for 1995–2002.
[15:13 24/9/2013 rdt030.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 8 1–28
8 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
As described below, our data allow us to identify the appropriate contract and occupation
category for most workers, so we know the sectoral minimum wage that applies to their jobs.
In our estimation sample, nearly all employees earn some premium above this level. (The 5th
percentile of the percentage premium is 2.5% while the median is 24%). Unfortunately, we do
not know whether a worker is covered by a firm-specific union agreement. We therefore interpret
our empirical models as measuring the sum of the wage premiums received by an individual
worker, including those due to firm-level union agreements. In Section 4.5, we use information
on the propensity for firm-level unionization (by sector and firm size) to classify firms into those
that are more or less likely to be covered by a firm agreement, and compare results for the two
subsamples.
3.2. Primary data sources
Our data set combines three types of information: individual earnings records, firm financial data,
and contractual minimum wage rates. The earnings data are derived from the Veneto Workers
History (VWH) dataset, which is based on Social Security earnings records for private sector
employees in the Veneto region over the period from 1975 to 2001 (see Tattara and Valentini,
2007). The VWH includes total earnings during the calendar year for each job, the number of
days worked during the year, indicators for the appropriate sectoral contract and occupation level
within that contract (i.e., a “job ladder” code), and the worker’s gender, age, region (or country)
of birth, and seniority with the firm. For firms the VWH includes industry (classified by five-
digit ATECO 91), the dates of “birth” and closure of the firm (if applicable), detailed geographic
information, and the firm’s national tax number (codice fiscale).
Our balance sheet data are derived from standardized reports that firms are required to file
annually with the Chamber of Commerce.12 These data are distributed as the “AIDA” database by
Bureau van Djik, and are available from 1995 onward for firms with annual sales above 500,000
euros. In principal, all (non-financial) incorporated firms with annual sales above this threshold
are included in the database. The available data include sales, value added, total wage bill, the
book value of capital (broken into a number of subcategories), the total number of employees,
industry (categorized by five-digit code), and the firm’s tax number.
Contractual minimum wage levels were obtained from records of the national contracts. We
were able to reconstruct the minimum wages over our sample period for major national contracts
in construction, metal and mechanical engineering, textiles and clothing, food, furniture and
wood products, trade, tourism, and services. We were unable to obtain information for one large
sector—chemicals—and for many other small sectoral contracts. For each occupation grade listed
in the contract, we have information on the minimum wage, the cost-of-living allowance, and
other special allowances. Typically, the contractual minimum wage levels are updated once or
twice per year to adjust for changes in the cost of living allowance.
3.3. Matching employee data to the financial data
We use fiscal code identifiers to match job-year observations for employees in the VWH to
employer information in AIDA for the period from 1995 to 2001. The match rate is relatively
high for the larger firms that are contained in AIDA, but is relatively low for very small firms that
are either unincorporated or fall below the 500,000 Euro annual sales threshold for inclusion in
12. These data are known as the Company Register database (Registro delle Imprese). Law 580 of 1993 established
the Chamber of Commerce as the depository for standardized financial and balance sheet data for all incorporated firms
in Italy.
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AIDA. Appendix Table A1 shows that for firm/year observations in the VWH with 50 or more
employees, 90% or more can be matched to AIDA. The match rate falls to 48% for firm-year
observations with 15–49 employees in the VWH, and to only 5% for firm-year observations with
under 15 employees in VWH.
We evaluated the quality of our matching procedure by comparing the total number of workers
in the VWH who are recorded as having a job at a given firm (in October of a given year) with
the total number of employees reported in AIDA (for the same year). In general, the two counts
agree very closely. To reduce the influence of false matches, we eliminated a small number of
matches for which the absolute difference between the number of employees reported in AIDA
and the number found in the VWH exceeded 100. Removing these outliers (less than 1% of all
firms), the correlation between the number of employees in the balance sheet and the number
found in the VWH is 0.99. The correlation between total wages and salaries for the calendar year
reported in AIDA and total wage payments reported for employees in the VWH is also very high
(0.98).
Column 1 of Table 1 provides some descriptive information on the set of workers aged 16–64
years who appear at least once in the VWH data between 1995 and 2001. This sample includes
nearly 2 million individuals who were observed in 3.11 million job spells at 191,000 firms. About
40% of the workers are female, while just under one-half are younger than the age of 30 years
and about one-sixth are aged 45 years or older. The mean daily wage (for jobs observed in 2000)
was 65 Euros.
Column 2 of Table 1 shows the characteristics of the job-year observations we successfully
matched to AIDA. (We exclude the small number of publicly traded firms prior to matching,
since most of these firms have multiple branches in many sectors.) About one-half of all
workers observed between 1995 and 2001 in the VWH can be matched to an AIDA firm: nearly
all the non-matches are employees of very small firms that are absent from AIDA. Overall
we have matched data for about 18,000 firms, or about 10% of the total universe of firms
contained in the VWH. Average firm size for the matched jobs sample (36.0 employees) is
substantially above the average for all firms in the VWH (7.0 employees). Mean daily wages for
the matched observations are also higher, while the fractions of female and younger workers are
lower.
From the set of potential matches described in column 2, we made a series of exclusions
to derive our final estimation sample. First, to ensure that we capture any irregular bonus or
salary payments, we eliminated job-year observations for jobs that lasted only part of a year.
We also eliminated apprentices (whose wages are typically very low), managers (who may
receive significant non-wage compensation), and part-time workers (to reduce measurement
error due to lack of information on hours of work). Second, we eliminated employees in the
construction industry, since our instrumental variables strategy relies on sales shocks in the
same sector in other regions of Italy, and such shocks are arguably less relevant for firms
in construction.13 Third, we eliminated firms with fewer than 15 employees. These firms are
exempt from many labour regulations (see e.g., Schivardi and Torrini, 2008).14 Moreover,
we suspect that the degree of rent-sharing at these firms is limited. Indeed, as discussed
below, we find that rent-sharing in Veneto is mainly confined to firms with 100 or more
employees.
13. We also eliminated workers in one small textile industry (furs), and several other industries with a relatively
small number of firms outside the Veneto area. Elimination of these sectors does not change the basic OLS rent-sharing
models (in Table 2).
14. Workers at these firms are also excluded from the key rights of worker representation under the Statuto dei
Lavoratori of 1970—see Cella and Treu (2009).
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TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics for workers, firms, and job matches
Estimation sample
Universe of Matched Full Subset matched Subset matched
job-year job-year sample to sectoral to weighted average
observations observations minimum wage of sectoral
minimum wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Characteristics of workers
1. Number of individual workers 1,990,751 985,160 416,587 305,364 395,149
2. Per cent female 42.3 34.4 27.3 26.8 29.9
3. Per cent age 30 or less 45.6 39.8 41.3 42.5 41.2
4. Per cent age 45 or more 17.1 19.8 18.1 17.4 18.2
5. Per cent white collar 29.6 29.8 31.3 32.9 29.9
6. Mean daily wage (real Euros) 64.8 74.2 68.9 68.4 68.7
7. Mean drift component of daily wage
(real Euros)
– – – 21.2 21.1
Characteristics of firms
8. Number of individual firms 191,205 18,312 7,283 5,677 6,864
9. Firm size (number of employees)a 7.0 36.0 54.4 54.8 58.2
10. Value added/worker
(1000’s real Euros)
– 59.2 44.6 44.5 44.3
11. Valued added/worker less industry
mean wage (1000’s of real Euros)
– 33.1 24.4 24.3 24.1
12. Valued added/worker less sectoral
min. wage (1000’s of real Euros)
– – – 30.2 30.2
13. Quasi-rent/worker, using industry
mean wage (1000’s of real Euros)
– 23.3 20.0 20.1 19.7
14. Quasi-rent/worker, using sectoral
min. wage (1000’s of real Euros)
– – – 26.2 25.8
Characteristics of job match
15. Number of job matches 3,111,061 1,223,889 452,136 328,824 427,322
16. Mean duration of job (years) 2.1 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.1
Notes: Sample in column 1 includes observed jobs for individuals between the ages of 16 and 64 years in Veneto Worker
History File during a calendar year between 1995 and 2001. Sample in column 2 includes subset of job-year observations
that can be matched to AIDA balance sheet data for the firm (in the same calendar year). Estimation sample excludes
part-year jobs, jobs at firms with under 15 employees, part-time jobs, jobs held by apprentices and managers, and jobs
in construction and sectors with a relatively small number of AIDA firms outside Veneto. Sample in column 4 includes
job-year observations that can be matched to information on the minimum wage in the relevant sectoral contract. Sample
in column 5 includes job-year observations that can be matched to a weighted average of local sectoral minimum wages.
aIn column 1, firm size is based on number of employees as of October in VWH data. In other columns firm size is from
AIDA data.
Finally, to reduce the influence of outliers, we delete firm-year observations with unusually
high or low values of value added per worker and capital per worker (outside the 1%–99% range)
of these key variables. As an alternative, we Winsorized the data at the 1% and 2% levels and
obtained very similar results—see Section 4.2. The characteristics of the resulting sample are
shown in column 3 of Table 1. The estimation sample includes about 40% of the individuals
and firms in the overall sample of potential matches in column 2.15 As shown in Appendix
Table A1, the estimation sample has about the same distribution across firm size categories
as the overall matched VHW-AIDA sample, apart from the exclusion of firms with under 15
workers.
15. The largest reduction in sample size comes from the year-round job requirement. As discussed below, we find
that adding in part-year workers has little effect on our main estimation results.
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We were able to match information on the sectoral minimum wage for about 73% of the
observations in the overall estimation sample. The resulting subsample is summarized in column
4 of Table 1. The age, gender, and earnings distributions of workers who can be matched to a
sectoral minimum wage are not too different from those in the overall estimation sample. For
this group, we can also construct an estimate of the “wage drift” component of salary: the gap
between the average daily wage and the sectoral minimum. As shown in row 7, mean drift is 21
Euros per day, or about 25% of average total compensation.
Our bargaining model emphasizes the importance of the alternative wage that workers can
earn in lieu of their current job. While the sectoral minimum wage or an industry average wage
are potential choices for this variable, we also constructed a third potential alternative wage
based on local mobility patterns and contractual minimums in each sectors.16 Specifically, we
began by assigning each firm to one of the 40 local labour markets (Sistemi Locali del Lavoro,
or SSL) identified by ISTAT for the Veneto region based on home-to-work commuting patterns
in the 2001 Census. Within each SSL, we then used our VWH sample to estimate average
transition probabilities between two-digit industries for job-changers in the 1995–2001 period.
(We do this separately for blue-collar and white-collar workers.) Finally, for each sector of origin
× blue-collar/white-collar occupation group we calculate the alternative wage as a transition-
probability-weighted average of the lowest sectoral minimum wage in each potential destination
sector (ignoring any sectors for which we have no contract data).
Column 5 of Table 1 shows the characteristics of the subsample of workers in our main
estimation sample that can be assigned this “weighted average of sectoral minimum wages”. This
subsample includes nearly 95% of the workers and 85% of the firms in the overall estimation
sample, and is quite similar in terms of basic characteristics.
The entries in rows 10–14 of Table 1 show the mean values of various indicators of firm
profitability. Mean value added per worker (in thousands of Euros per year) is reported in row 10.
This is slightly higher in the overall sample of matches (column 2) but very similar between
columns 3, 4, and 5. Row 11 shows the mean of value added per worker minus a crude estimate
of the opportunity cost of labour based on the average wage in the firm’s (two digit) industry.
In the notation of our model this is R(Kt, t)/L – mt, where mt is the industry mean wage. For
comparison, row 12 shows an estimate of value added per worker minus the sectoral minimum
wage (which is only available for the subsample that can be matched to contracts in column 4).
Since the industry average wage is above the sectoral minimum wage, the latter is substantially
larger than the former. Finally, rows 13 and 14 show an estimate of value added per worker, minus
the alternative wage, minus 10% of capital per worker, i.e., R(Kt, t)/L – mt – 0.1Kt/L. Assuming
there are no holdup issues, and that the user cost of capital is 10%, this is an estimate of quasi-rent
per worker. Again, we present two estimates, using either the industry average wage (row 13) or
the minimum sectoral wage (row 14). A comparison of average quasi-rent per worker (using the
sectoral minimum wage) to the average markup of wages over the sectoral minimum implies an
estimate for  of approximately 0.25.17 We suspect that this estimate of workers’bargaining power
is upward-biased, since it assumes that 100% of the markup over the sectoral minimum wage is
a rent premium, whereas some fraction is probably due to skill differences that are rewarded in
all jobs. Indeed, as discussed in Section 4.7 our estimates of the relationship between wages and
quasi-rents suggest an estimate of  in the range of 5–10%.
16. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this wage measure.
17. From equation (2b), (w − m) =  Q∗/L, implying that a rough estimate of  is the ratio of the average markup
of the wage over the contractual minimum wage, divided by quasi-rent per worker. To construct the ratio, we multiply
the mean drift in row 7 (21.2 Euros per day) times 312 working days per year and divide by quasi-rent per worker in row
14 (which is in 1000s).
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TABLE 2
OLS estimates of rent sharing model
Using Using Using weighted
industry mean sectoral minimum average of sectoral
as alternative as alternative minimums as
wage wage alternative wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Value added per worker 0.294 0.275 0.254 0.247 0.388 0.311
(0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.041) (0.032)
2. Capital stock per worker 0.000 0.004 −0.033 −0.028 −0.009 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
3. Alternative wage 0.629 0.374 1.757 1.467 1.185 0.305
(0.038) (0.048) (0.072) (0.081) (0.206) (0.107)
4. Additional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
5. Number of person-year observations 1,395,031 1,395,031 984,329 984,329 1,327,493 1,327,493
Addendum
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. rents 0.073 0.068 0.078 0.076 0.120 0.096
Ratio of estimated coefficients— 0.000 −0.016 0.132 0.114 0.024 −0.012
row 2 ÷ row 1 (abs. value) (0.035) (0.038) (0.050) (0.048) (0.033) (0.016)
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is log of average daily wage. All models include year dummies. Controls added
in columns 2, 4, and 6 are as follows: quadratic in age, quadratic in job tenure, dummy for white-collar occupation,
quadratic in firm age, quadratic in log of number of workers at firm. Standard errors clustered by four-digit industry in
parentheses.
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS
4.1. Basic results
As a point of reference, Table 2 presents a set of simple OLS models which relate the average
wage earned by an individual to the components of observed quasi-rent at his or her employer and
a measure of the alternative wage. We present specifications with only year effects and the three
covariates shown in the table, and models with a richer set of controls (including age and tenure,
firm size, and firm age) for three choices of the alternative wage: the (two-digit) industry-wide
average wage (columns 1 and 2); the sectoral minimum wage (columns 3 and 4); and the weighted
average of sectoral minimums (columns 5 and 6). For the models in this table and throughout
the article, we report standard errors that are clustered at the four-digit industry level (about 480
clusters). These are slightly larger than standard errors clustered at the firm level, reflecting a
shared industry-level component of residual variance.
The estimates in Table 2 confirm that in our sample, as in other samples analysed in the
literature, wages are positively correlated with value added per worker. The magnitude of the
partial correlation varies somewhat depending on the measure of outside wage opportunities, and
is also slightly lower when controls for worker and firm characteristics are added, but in all cases
the estimated effects are precisely estimated. The implied elasticities of wages with respect to
quasi-rent per worker are reported at the bottom of the table, and are in the range of 0.07–0.12.18
In contrast to the uniformly positive effect of value added per worker, the estimated effect of
capital per worker varies with the choice of the alternative wage. Using the industry average wage
or the weighted average of sectoral minimums as the alternative wage, the estimated coefficients
on the capital stock per worker are very close to 0. Using the contractual minimum wage (which
18. We estimate the elasticity by multiplying the coefficient of value added per worker (in row 1 of the table) by the
sample average value of quasi-rent per worker, assuming no holdup issues and a 10% return to capital. This is constructed
as value added per worker, minus the alternative wage, minus 0.1 times capital stock per worker.
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may do a better job of controlling for unobserved worker skills), the estimated coefficient is
clearly negative. The bottom row of the table shows the implied estimates of the return to capital
(which are based on the ratio of the effect of capital per worker to the effect of value added per
worker), along with standard errors (obtained by the delta method). Depending on the choice of
the alternative wage, these estimates suggest either complete holdup (columns 1–2 and 5–6) or
an offset that is consistent with a user cost of capital of about 10% (columns 3–4).
A concern with the models in Table 2 is unobserved heterogeneity in firm profitability and
worker skills. In particular, if more profitable firms tend to hire better-qualified workers (as
suggested by Bartolucci and Devicienti, 2012) OLS models like those in Table 2 will tend to
overstate the causal effect of rent-sharing on wages. Several recent studies have used matched
worker-firm data to relate within-job changes in the profitability of the firm to within-job wage
growth (see e.g., Margolis and Salvanes, 2001; Guertzgen, 2009; Martins, 2009). This approach
eliminates biases caused by permanent heterogeneity due to worker, firm, or match effects.
Table 3 presents estimation results based on this within-job approach. In all cases, we
include the richer set of controls included in the even-numbered columns of Table 2. Within-
job models estimated by OLS are presented in columns 1, 3, and 5. These specifications yield
small (but precisely estimated) estimates of the effect of profitability on wages. Compared to
models without match effects (e.g., in Table 2), the implied elasticities of wages with respect to
quasi-rents are reduced by a factor of 8–10. Taken at face value, these models suggest that rent-
sharing is statistically significant but quantitatively unimportant in explaining wage variability
in Italy.
While job dummies eliminate the biases due to unobserved worker and firm characteristics,
the within-job correlation between wages and profitability is largely dominated by short-run
fluctuations in value added per worker and wages. Inspection of the data suggests that there are
often large year-to-year changes in sales and materials costs that are unrelated to labour or capital
TABLE 3
OLS and IV within-spell estimates of rent sharing model
Using Using Using weighted
industry mean sectoral minimum average of sectoral
as alternative as alternative minimums as
wage wage alternative wage
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Value added per worker 0.032 0.117 0.030 0.146 0.030 0.142
(0.005) (0.062) (0.007) (0.071) (0.006) (0.061)
2. Capital stock per worker −0.002 −0.012 −0.002 −0.015 −0.003 −0.016
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008)
3. Alternative wage 0.011 0.010 0.801 0.800 0.090 0.098
(0.009) (0.007) (0.035) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026)
4. Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5. Number of person-year observations 1,395,301 1,395,301 984,329 984,329 1,327,493 1,327,493
6. First-stage F-statistic – 28.2 – 20.3 – 28.5
Addendum
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. rents 0.008 0.029 0.009 0.045 0.010 0.044
Ratio of estimated coefficients— 0.074 0.107 0.058 0.105 0.093 0.116
row 2 ÷ row 1 (abs. value) (0.098) (0.025) (0.111) (0.023) (0.100) (0.022)
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is log of average daily wage. All models include a complete set of job-spell
dummies as well as year effects and the covariates described in Table 2 that vary within-job spells. In IV models (columns
2, 4, and 6) value-added per worker is treated as endogenous. Instrument is revenue per worker for firms in the same
four-digit industry in the same year in other regions of Italy. Standard errors clustered by four-digit industry in parentheses.
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inputs, reflecting choices about when to book sales or take a charge for input costs.19 We suspect
that many such changes are spurious and irrelevant for rent-sharing. Indeed, in an analysis based
on Social Security earnings and financial data for Italian firms, Guiso et al. (2005) find that
wages are about 10 times more responsive to permanent shocks in value added than to transitory
shocks.
A simple approach to address the problem of spurious fluctuations in value added is to use an
instrumental variable that is correlated with systematic changes in firm-specific profitability, but
uncorrelated with other unobserved determinants of wages, including supply-side shocks. Given
that our sample firms are located in the Veneto region, we decided to use average revenues per
worker for firms in the same four-digit industry but in other regions of Italy as an instrument.
This variable provides a proxy for industry-wide demand shocks that affect the profitability
of employers in our sample, but should be uncorrelated with measurement errors or transitory
fluctuations in value added. It is also a relatively strong predictor of value added per worker (see
the first stage F-statistics in row 6).
Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 3 report within-spell IV estimates of our wage determination
model. The IV strategy leads to a substantial increase in the magnitude of the estimated response
of wages to value added: the implied elasticities of wages with respect to quasi rents are in the
range of 0.03–0.045—about one-half as large as the elasticities from the simple OLS models in
Table 2. The IV strategy also yields estimates of the wage offset for capital per worker that are
robust to the choice of the alternative wage, and in all cases about one-tenth as large in magnitude
as the responses to value added per worker, consistent with the predictions of a no-holdup model
and a user cost of capital of 10%. Given the imprecision of the estimates and uncertainty about the
precise level of capital costs, we obviously cannot rule out a modest holdup effect. For example,
if the true user cost of capital is 12% and one-quarter of capital investments are “held up” (i.e.,
(1−)=0.25) we would expect the ratio of the effect of capital per worker and value added
to worker to be 0.08 (i.e., 8%), a value that is only marginally significantly different from the
estimate in column 6 of Table 3.
We note that other studies have also found a much larger degree of rent-sharing in IV versus
OLS models. Abowd and Lemieux (1993), for example, estimate wage determination models
for union contracts in Canada and find very small rent-sharing effects in OLS specifications,
but much larger effects when U.S. prices are used to instrument the quasi-rent measures. Van
Reenen (1996) finds that instrumenting a measure of quasi-rents with indicators for firm-specific
innovations and other industry-level variables leads to a doubling of the elasticity of wages with
respect to quasi-rents. Arai and Heyman (2009) compare OLS and IV estimates of rent-sharing
in Sweden using worker-firm data with job-match effects and find approximately 10 times larger
impacts when profits per worker are instrumented with lagged profits.20
4.2. Robustness checks
We have conducted a number of robustness checks to ensure that the IV estimates in Table 3 are
not simply an artefact of our sample selection procedures or the functional form of our models. In
one set of checks, we compared the impact of censoring versus dropping outlying observations.
Appendix Table A2 reports the baseline IV specification from column 6 of Table 3 and two
alternatives: one Winsoring the top and bottom 1% of observations, and a second Winsorizing
19. We suspect that such fluctuations are especially large in our sample of relatively small non-listed firms since
there is no “market discipline” on their accounting choices.
20. Margolis and Salvanes (2001) also find that IV estimates of rent-sharing are much larger than OLS estimates
for both France and Norway, though their IV estimates are relatively imprecise.
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the top and bottom 2% of observations. The key coefficient estimates are very similar under the
alternative choices, suggesting that the choice to trim versus Winsorize the outlying observations
is inconsequential.
We also checked whether exclusion of part time or part year workers have much impact on
our findings. Appendix Table A3 reports two additional IV models: one that includes part-time
workers (with a dummy variable added for part-timers); and a second that includes both part-time
and part-year workers (with controls for part-time and part-year status). The estimates of the key
parameters are very similar to those in column 6 of Table 3.
In a third series of checks, we considered alternative functional forms for our rent-sharing
model. One alternative is to relate wages to the logarithms of value added per worker and capital
per worker, rather than the levels of these variables. Appendix Table A4 (column 2) shows the
estimated coefficients from this “log-log” specification, as well as the implied estimates of the
derivatives of log wages with respect to capital per worker and value added per worker. The
implied derivatives and their ratio are very similar to the corresponding estimates from our
baseline model, suggesting that the choice of whether to use levels or logs of value added and
capital per worker has little effect.
Another specification issue is whether to include log employment and its square as additional
controls in the wage model. Adding these controls eliminates endogeneity bias in the measured
effect of capital per worker due to a correlation between employment and the unobserved
component of wages, for example due to overtime hours.21 (Similar concerns about the effect
of value added per worker are eliminated by the IV procedure). Appendix Table A4 (column 3)
shows the estimated coefficients from a specification that excludes these controls. The estimated
effects of capital per worker are more negative than in our baseline specification, consistent with
a possible correlation between hours and employment. We conclude that including these controls
in our baseline models leads to a more conservative estimate of the degree of offset for capital
costs.
A fourth issue is the measurement of capital. For our baseline specifications we use the
book value of capital, which is relatively noisy. As a check, we constructed our own capital
series for firms that are continuously observed from 1995 onward, following the approach of
Benfratello et al. (2001).22 Appendix Table A5 shows estimates of our baseline specification and
a parallel specification estimated using this re-constructed capital series. Estimates from these
two specifications are very similar. In particular, the implicit user cost of capital is 9.7% (standard
error 2.6%) using the newly constructed capital series for continuously observed firms.
A fifth concern with our IV strategy is that industry-level shocks may be correlated with the
unobserved determinants of wages, leading to a bias in the estimated effect of value added per
worker. Such biases are most likely to arise in specialized local labour markets, where many
of the alternative jobs for a given worker are in the same narrowly defined industry as his/her
current employer. To investigate the likely magnitude of these biases, we obtained a list of the
“Industrial Districts” in the Veneto region identified by ISTAT using 2001 Census data.23 We
then re-estimated our wage model excluding the 15% of person-year observations contributed by
employees of the main (two-digit) industry in each district. The results are reported in Appendix
21. If overtime hours rise when firms hire more workers, average daily wages will be negatively correlated with
capital/worker leading to an estimated offset effect that is too large.
22. See the Appendix for details of the formula, which uses observed investments, industry- specific depreciation
rates and price indices for investment goods, and the book value of capital in 1995 as a starting value for the capital stock
in each firm.
23. See Boari (2001) for a detailed discussion of the classification of Industrial Districts in Italy, and de Blasio and
Di Addario (2005) for an analysis of the effects of these districts.
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Table A4 (column 4) and are quite similar to our baseline results, yielding an estimate of the
implicit cost of capital of 12.1% (standard error 2.2%).
4.3. First differenced models
An alternative to the within-job estimation strategy used in Table 3 is to fit models in first
differences. Although a “within” specification is more efficient if the model is correctly specified,
there are several reasons to consider differenced models. Differencing is arguably more flexible
than fixed effects, since unobserved factors need only be constant over a two-year horizon.
Moreover, any misspecification is likely to lead to different biases in the fixed effects and first
differenced models, so a comparison of the estimates provides an informal specification check.
Finally, a differenced framework is more easily adapted to handle endogeneity in current capital
per worker, arising for example from measurement error.
Columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 4 present first-differenced models in which we treat value added
as endogenous but assume capital per worker is exogenous. Building on our IV approach in
Table 3, we use the change in revenues per worker at firms in the same four-digit industry in other
regions of Italy as an instrument for the change in value added per worker. A comparison of these
models with the corresponding IV models in Table 3 suggests that differencing yields somewhat
larger estimates of the responses to both value added per worker and capital per worker than a
within-job approach. The implied user costs of capital are quite similar from the two approaches,
however, and consistent with no holdup and a 10% user cost of capital.
TABLE 4
IV differenced estimates of rent sharing model
Using Using Using weighted
industry mean sectoral minimum average of sectoral
as alternative as alternative minimums as
wage wage alternative wage
K/L K/L K/L K/L K/L K/L
exogenous endogenous exogenous endogenous exogenous endogenous
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Value added per worker (first difference) 0.239 0.286 0.236 0.340 0.236 0.316
(0.081) (0.135) (0.100) (0.190) (0.080) (0.150)
2. Capital stock per worker (first difference) −0.029 −0.030 −0.028 −0.028 −0.030 −0.031
(0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017)
3. Alternative wage (first difference) −0.001 0.002 0.562 0.491 0.033 0.042
(0.003) (0.004) (0.019) (0.034) (0.013) (0.021)
4. Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5. Number of person-year observations 825,357 360,037 570,986 242,504 825,357 349,827
6. First-stage F-statistic (value-added) 25.8 10.8 17.7 6.4 26.1 9.3
7. First-stage F-statistic (capital) – 140.6 – 79.0 – 170.4
Addendum
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. rents 0.074 0.090 0.072 0.107 0.073 0.098
Ratio of estimated coefficients— 0.125 0.106 0.117 0.083 0.125 0.098
row 2 ÷ row 1 (abs. value) (0.020) (0.034) (0.024) (0.030) (0.020) (0.032)
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is first difference of log of average daily wage. All models include year effects
and the covariates described in Table 2 that vary within-job spells (in first difference form). Models in columns 1, 3, and
5 treat capital per worker as exogenous and are estimated over the period from 1996 to 2001. Models in columns 2, 4,
and 6 treat capital per worker as endogenous and are estimated over the period from 1997 to 2000. Instrument for change
in value added per worker is change in revenue per worker for firms in the same four-digit industry in the same year in
other regions of Italy. Instrument for change in capital per worker is difference between capital per worker between t – 2
and t + 1. Standard errors clustered by four-digit industry in parentheses.
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While reassuring, this similarity does not address possible correlations between capital per
worker and the error component in the wage equation. We suspect that the most likely source of
such endogeneity is measurement error in the capital stock. A standard approach to endogeneity
in panel data models is to use KLt−2 (the second lag of capital per worker) as an instrument
for KLt = KLt–KLt−1. Unfortunately, in our data the correlation between KLt and KLt−2 is
weak (since capital per worker is close to a random walk) so this strategy will not work. Provided
that the only source of endogeneity is serially uncorrelated measurement errors, however, we can
use the longer difference KLt+1–KLt−2 as an instrument for KLt (see e.g., Wooldridge, 2002,
pp. 311–315).
Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 4 present the resulting IV estimation results, treating both value
added per worker and capital per worker as endogenous. The effects of value added per worker
and capital per worker are somewhat larger in magnitude than from the specifications in columns
1, 3, and 5, but less precisely estimated. Importantly, however, the relative size of the capital
offset is similar whether we treat capital as exogenous or endogenous, and consistent with a user
cost of capital of about 10%. Overall, we conclude that the size of the capital offset effect is robust
to using fixed effects or first differences, and is also robust to a long-differences IV strategy that
deals with serially uncorrelated measurement error in capital. We caution, however, that we have
only limited ability to address the most general endogeneity concerns.
4.4. Allowing for different forms of capital
The balance sheets reported in AIDA include information on three broad categories of capital:
tangible fixed assets (buildings and machinery); intangible fixed assets (intellectual property,
research and development investments, goodwill); and current assets or “working capital”
(inventories, receivables, and liquid financial assets). To investigate the effects of different types
of capital, we re-estimated the IV models in Table 3, allowing separate coefficients for each
type of capital. The results are presented in Table 5. We find negative coefficients for all three
types of capital, with the largest offset effect for intangible fixed assets, an intermediate offset for
tangible fixed assets, and the smallest offset for working capital. The ratios of the estimated offset
coefficients to the coefficient of value added per worker are shown in the bottom rows of Table 5,
and show relatively high implicit returns for fixed assets and relatively low implicit returns for
current assets.
The finding of a larger offset effect for fixed assets is the opposite of what might be expected
under a holdup story, since fixed assets are more vulnerable to holdup. Instead, the point estimates
are consistent with full offset of capital costs and a lower user cost for working capital than fixed
assets.
4.5. Heterogeneity in rent-sharing and holdup
The models presented so far ignore any heterogeneity across firms or workers in the degree of
rent-sharing or holdup (apart from differences due to the structure of capital). In this section, we
present estimates of our basic specification (from column 6 of Table 3) for different subgroups.
Given the limited precision of our pooled estimates, we focus on pair-wise comparisons between
relatively large subgroups of employers or workers. We also limit attention to our preferred
alternative wage measure, the weighted average of sectoral minimums.
We begin in Table 6 by examining differences across firms that are likely to be correlated with
the underlying level of rents per worker. Columns 1 and 2 of the table show results fit separately
for larger firms (100 or more workers) and smaller firms (under 100 workers). A comparison of
these models suggests that rent-sharing is important for larger firms. For smaller firms, however,
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TABLE 5
IV within-spell estimates of rent sharing model, distinguishing three types of capital
Using Using Using weighted
industry mean sectoral minimum average of sectoral
as alternative as alternative minimums as
wage wage alternative wage
(1) (2) (3)
1. Value added per worker 0.120 0.154 0.148
(0.074) (0.080) (0.074)
2. Tangible fixed assets per worker (plant and equipment) −0.011 −0.013 −0.015
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
3. Intangible Fixed Assets per Worker −0.027 −0.033 −0.031
(intellectual property, R&D, goodwill) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013)
4. Current assets per worker −0.003 −0.005 −0.005
(inventories, receiveables, liquid funds) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
5. Alternative wage 0.010 0.801 0.063
(0.006) (0.029) (0.016)
6. Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
7. Number of person-year observations 1,395,301 984,329 1,327,493
8. First-stage F-statistic 22.8 17.0 22.9
Addendum
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. rents 0.030 0.047 0.046
Ratio of estimated coefficients (abs. value):
Tangible fixed assets (row 2 ÷ row 1) 0.092 0.087 0.098
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
Intangible fixed assets (row 3 ÷ row 1) 0.225 0.217 0.210
(0.134) (0.114) (0.110)
Current assets (row 4 ÷ row 1) 0.021 0.035 0.035
(0.047) (0.032) (0.034)
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is log of average daily wage. Models include a complete set of job-spell dummies
as well as year effects and the covariates described in Table 2 that vary within-job spells. Value-added per worker is treated
as endogenous. Instrument is revenue per worker for firms in the same four-digit industry in the same year in other regions
of Italy.Alternative wage is weighted average of sectoral minimum wages. Standard errors clustered by four-digit industry
in parentheses.
there is no evidence that fluctuations in value added or capital have any significant effects on
wages. Among larger firms the implied return on capital is 15.7% (standard error = 3.7%)—a
value that does not suggest significant holdup problems, particularly since these firms may have
somewhat lower capital costs than the overall sample of firms.
As noted earlier, we lack information on firm-level union contracts, which may be an important
channel for rent-sharing in Italy. As an alternative we used a relatively recent firm survey—the
2005 Survey of Enterprises and Employment (Rilevazione Imprese e Lavoro), conducted by
ISFOL, the Institute for Development of Vocational Training—to estimate a probit model for
union coverage and impute the probability of coverage for firms in our sample. The model
included 49 industry dummies and five firm-size dummies, as well as province dummies. Using
the predicted coverage probabilities for Veneto region, we then divided firms in our sample into
higher and lower predicted unionization groups, and fit the models reported in columns 3 and 4
of Table 6. As expected given the firm-size results in columns 1 and 2, and the strong connection
between union coverage and firm size in the 2005 survey, we find that degree of rent-sharing is
higher for the firms that are more likely to be covered by a union contract. For these firms the
implied return on capital is 13.9% (standard error = 3.5%), providing little evidence of a holdup
problem for firms that directly bargain with unions.
A third interesting way to classify firms is by their degree of market power. We use the Lerner
index (i.e., the price-cost margin) to classify firms as having above average or below average
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TABLE 6
Differences in rent sharing and holdup by selected firm characteristics (IV within-spell estimates)
By firm size By probability that By firm-specific
firm is covered by Lerner index
union contract (price-cost markup)
100+ <100 Higher Lower Higher Lower
workers workers probability probability markup markup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Value added per worker 0.202 0.068 0.155 0.129 0.167 0.088
(0.079) (0.091) (0.067) (0.141) (0.072) (0.100)
2. Capital stock per worker −0.032 −0.003 −0.022 −0.012 −0.024 −0.007
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011)
3. Alternative wage 0.072 0.060 0.100 0.094 0.099 0.096
(0.023) (0.024) (0.033) (0.038) (0.024) (0.037)
4. Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5. Number of person-year observations 575,418 752,075 663,098 664,367 616,151 711,342
6. First-stage F-statistic 19.0 12.9 24.5 8.7 24.1 15.3
Addendum
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. rents 0.062 0.021 0.053 0.035 0.059 0.024
Ratio of estimated coefficients— 0.157 0.046 0.139 0.089 0.145 0.081
row 2 ÷ row 1 (abs. value) (0.037) (0.089) (0.035) (0.038) (0.029) (0.045)
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is log of average daily wage. All models include a complete set of job-spell
dummies as well as year effects and the covariates described in Table 2 that vary within-job spells. Alternative wage is
weighted average of sectoral minimum wages. Value added per worker is treated as endogenous. Instrument is revenue
per worker for firms in the same four-digit industry in the same year in other regions of Italy. Alternative wage is weighted
average of sectoral minimum wages. Standard errors clustered by four-digit industry in parentheses.
market power. Estimates for the two groups of firms, shown in the final two columns of Table 6,
suggest that rent-sharing is mainly confined to firms with higher market power. (We obtain very
similar results when we classify firms based on the Herfindahl index for their four-digit industry.)
Among high-margin firms, the estimated wage effects of value added and capital are both highly
significant. The elasticity of wages with respect to quasi-rents is about 0.06, while the implied
return on capital is 14.5% (standard error = 2.9%), similar to the values for larger firms, and
those with higher predicted union coverage rates. Among low-margin firms, value added and
capital have relatively small and statistically insignificant effects on wages, suggesting little or
no rent-sharing.
We have also examined differences along several other dimensions, including broad industry
category (manufacturing versus other sectors) and, within manufacturing, by whether the firm has
relatively high or low capital per worker. These results are summarized in Appendix Table A6.
In brief, results for the manufacturing sector (which accounts for 75% of our observations) are
quite similar to the results for the overall sample. Within manufacturing, we find that rent sharing
is mainly confined to firms with higher capital per worker. For the non-manufacturing sector, the
degree of rent sharing is imprecisely estimated, but we find a similar relative offset for capital as
in the overall sample.
The degree of rent-sharing may also differ between groups of workers. We examined several
different dimensions of employee heterogeneity, including men versus women and blue-collar
versus white-collar. As reported in Appendix Table A7, we find small differences by gender but
a bigger gap by occupation group. Specifically, the point estimates suggest a higher degree of
rent-sharing for blue-collar workers than white-collar workers, though the standard errors of the
estimates are large enough that the gaps are not significant. Interestingly, however, the implied
returns on capital costs are very similar across occupation groups, suggesting no differences in the
extent of holdup. We also examined differences by age and employee tenure, but found relatively
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small gaps. Overall, our analysis suggests that the heterogeneity in rent-sharing across different
types of workers is less systematic than the heterogeneity across firms.
4.6. Debt versus equity financing
In our theoretical and empirical discussions so far we have made no distinction between different
sources of capital financing. As we noted in Section 2, however, several analysts have argued
that the use of debt financing may mitigate holdup problems. This suggests that an alternative
explanation for the limited evidence of holdup in our main specifications is that firms with more
rent sharing use more debt financing. To test this explanation we stratified the firms in our sample
into two groups: those with an above-median ratio of debt to debt-plus-equity, and those with a
below-median ratio. We then fit our basic IV specification to the two sets of firms separately.
The results, reported in Appendix Table A8, show that the estimated coefficients of our model
vary somewhat between subsamples, with stronger evidence of rent-sharing at low-debt firms,
though the differences in coefficients between the two subsamples are not significant. Among
both groups of firms, the estimated offset effect of capital is consistent with no holdup and a
10–12% user cost of capital. Overall, we conclude that the limited magnitude of the estimated
holdup effect in our overall sample is not driven by high-debt firms.
4.7. Comparisons with the literature
A final issue we address is how our estimates of rent-sharing compare with the existing literature.
Since many previous studies look at firm-level data (e.g., Van Reenen, 1996), or use individual
wage data with worker effects or firm effects rather than job match effects (e.g., Martins, 2009),
we begin by examining the sensitivity of our rent-sharing models to these choices. Table 7 shows
estimates of our basic IV specification estimated in four ways: with job effects (column 1), with
firm effects (column 2), with worker effects (column 3), and finally with firm effects but using
the log of the average wage at the firm level as the dependent variable (column 4).
A comparison of columns 1–3 suggests that the use of firm effects leads to a slightly larger
estimate of the sensitivity of wages to profitability, whereas the use of worker effects leads to
a slightly smaller estimate. The use of firm-aggregated wage data (column 4) leads to point
estimates that are close to our main specification but somewhat noisier. Despite these (relatively
small) differences, the estimates from all four approaches support our two main conclusions:
(1) wages contain an offset for capital costs consistent with a 10–12% user cost of capital; (2)
the elasticity of wages with respect to quasi-rents per worker is on the order of 0.04–0.05 for
employees at a typical firm in our sample.
Previous studies have not tried to estimate the offset for capital costs, but provide a range of
estimates of the elasticity of wages with respect to quasi-rents. Two benchmark studies from the
1990s, Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and Van Reenen (1996), estimate relatively large elasticities
(in the range of 0.25) from their preferred IV specifications. Abowd and Lemieux focus on
unionized firms from the manufacturing sector in Canada, while Van Reenen studies listed
manufacturing firms in the U.K. Both papers use average wage data, with no controls for worker
quality. We suspect that the relatively large size of the firms and the absence of worker controls
contribute to the relatively larger size of their estimated wage elasticities.
The more recent literature based on individual-level wage data tends to find much smaller
elasticities of wages with respect to rents.24 Margolis and Salvanes (2001) find only weak
24. As pointed out by Van Reenen (1996, pp. 214–215) many of the earlier firm-level studies including Christofides
and Oswald (1992), Blanchflower et al. (1996), and Hildreth and Oswald (1997) also estimate rent-sharing elasticities in
the range of 0.04.
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TABLE 7
Comparisons of IV rent sharing model with job, firm, and worker effects
Job spell Firm Worker Firm averaged wages
effects effects effects with firm effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Value added per worker 0.142 0.174 0.119 0.125
(0.061) (0.062) (0.053) (0.070)
2. Capital stock per worker −0.016 −0.018 −0.021 −0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
3. Alternative wage 0.098 0.023 0.105 0.110
(0.026) (0.054) (0.028) (0.039)
4. Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
5. Number of observations 1,327,493 1,327,493 1,327,493 28,998
6. First-stage F-statistic 28.5 27.3 38.1 24.7
Addendum
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. rents 0.044 0.063 0.043 0.045
Ratio of estimated coefficients— 0.116 0.101 0.175 0.081
row 2 ÷ row 1 (abs. value) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.033)
Notes: Dependent variable in columns 1–3 is log of individual-level average daily wage during the calendar year.
Dependent variable in column 4 is log of average daily wage for all workers at firm. Model in column 1 include job-spell
dummies. Models in column 2 and 4 include firm dummies. Model in column 3 includes worker dummies. All models
include year effects and the covariates described in Table 2 that vary within-job spells (averaged to the firm level in the
case of column 4). Alternative wage is weighted average of sectoral minimum wages. Value added per worker is treated as
endogenous. Instrument is revenue per worker for firms in the same four-digit industry in the same year in other regions
of Italy. Standard errors clustered by four-digit industry in parentheses.
evidence of rent-sharing for workers in France or Norway, with quasi-rent elasticities in the
range of 0–0.03 from their IV specifications. Arai (2003) studies a small sample of Swedish
workers observed in 1981 and 1991. His estimates of the elasticity of wages with respect to
quasi-rents are in the range of 0.01–0.02. Arai and Heyman (2009) implement an IV estimation
strategy using a much-expanded version of the data used in Arai (2003) and obtain quasi-rent
elasticities in the range of 0.02–0.06. Martins (2009) uses longitudinal data for Portuguese
workers employed at large firms over a three-year period. His IV estimates imply an elasticity
of wages with respect to quasi-rents of 0.025–0.035. Guertzen (2009) studies a large sample
of German workers employed at large manufacturing and mining companies in the 1995–2001
period. She estimates quasi-rent elasticities in the range of 0.01–0.06, with larger effects for
employees at firms with firm-specific union contracts or no contracts. Finally, Guiso, Pistaferri,
and Schivardi (2005) find an elasticity of wages with respect to permanent shocks in value
added of 0.07 for a large sample of Italian workers and firms, implying a quasi-rent elasticity of
about 0.035.
Overall, our estimates of the elasticity of wages with respect to quasi-rents are quite similar to
estimates in other recent studies that use matched worker-firm data and a strategy to address
measurement errors and/or transitory fluctuations in value added or profits. An estimated
quasi-rent elasticity of 0.04–0.05 implies that the relative bargaining power of workers () is
low—in the range of 0.03–0.04.25 With such a low level of bargaining power the distortion
created by holdup is small, even in the worst-case scenario where all past investments are
held up. Specifically, as shown in equation (6), the worst-case “tax” on investment caused
by rent sharing is /(1−)≈ when  is small. Given that we also find a significant wage
25. The parameter  gives the derivative of wages (in levels) with respect to quasi-rents per worker (in levels).
Thus  = RεWQ where εWQ is the elasticity of wages with respect to quasi-rents and R is the ratio of the mean wage to
mean quasi-rents per worker, which is about 0.83 in our data.
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offset for capital, the distortionary effects of rent sharing on investment in our sample are
small.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Agrowing literature in many different areas of economics has emphasized the potential importance
of holdup in long-term relationships where binding contracts are unenforceable (see e.g., Che
and Sakovics, 2008; MacLeod, 2010). Once a sunk investment is made by one party, some of the
returns may be captured by the other, lowering the return to investment and causing inefficiency.
The empirical significance of holdup effects in the labour market is unclear. Existing studies from
several different countries suggests that wages respond to employer-specific gains in productivity
(e.g., van Reenan, 1996; Guiso et al., 2005; Guertzgen, 2009; Martins, 2009). Whether there is
holdup or not, however, depends on whether the wage bargaining process allows the firm to
recoup its investment costs before splitting the rents with employees, and not on rent-sharing
per se.
We use a large matched employer–employee data set from the Veneto region of Italy to estimate
wage determination models that include separate effects for value added per worker and capital
per worker. We find systematic evidence of rent-sharing, with an average elasticity of wages with
respect to profits on the order of 4%–5%, mainly arising from larger firms with higher price-cost
margins. The relative size of the deduction for capital is consistent with efficient investment (i.e.,
no holdup) assuming an average user cost of capital of around 10%, though given the precision
of the estimates we cannot rule out a modest degree of holdup.
Our results suggest the need for caution in making inferences about holdup from evidence
on rent-sharing alone. In our setting, it appears that workers receive a share of the rents that
remain after the costs of capital are fully deducted. Of course different results could arise in other
institutional settings, where workers may have less concern about the ability of firms to divert
new investments. In any case, we believe that it is important to carefully consider the measure of
rents that is distributed in wage bargaining before reaching any conclusions about the impact of
rent-sharing on the efficiency of investment.
APPENDIX: RECOMPUTING CAPITAL STOCK
In the AIDA dataset, capital is measured at the book-value (historical costs), and net of accumulated depreciation. To
reconstruct the capital series at replacement cost, we adopted the procedures of Benfratello et al. (2001). Specifically,
define:
K◦t = net fixed assets (net of accumulated depreciation),
Knewt = net fixed assets, reconstructed at the replacement cost,
d = depreciation rate,
PIt = price index of investment goods,
At = amortization from the profit and lose accounts,
It = gross investment, where It = K◦t – K◦t−1 + At.
A base year t0 is selected (t0 =1995 in our case), and the following recursive formula is applied:
Knewt+1 = (1−d)(PIt/PIt−1)Knewt +It,
where the value for the base year is set at the net book value of fixed assets in that period. We use sector-specific depreciation
rates and price indices for investment goods, based on series reported by ISTAT for the calculation of aggregate capital
stock in Italy.
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TABLE A1
Number of firms and number of jobs in VWH, matched VWH-AIDA data, and estimation sample
Universe of Firm-year Column 2 Job-year Job-year Column 5
firm-year observations ÷ observations observations ÷
observations in matched Column 1 in matched in estimation Column 4
in VWH VWH-AIDA VWH-AIDA sample
N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of employees
<15 675,430 (88.6) 31,356 (38.7) 0.05 385,426 (12.8) 0 (–) –
15–50 68,570 (9.0) 32,977 (40.7) 0.48 908,722 (30.1) 412,911 (31.1) 0.45
50–100 10,990 (1.4) 9,934 (12.3) 0.90 641,921 (21.2) 333,202 (25.1) 0.52
100–250 5013 (0.7) 4987 (6.2) 0.99 582,489 (19.3) 317,114 (23.9) 0.54
>250 2028 (0.3) 1767 (2.2) 0.87 504,643 (16.7) 264,266 (19.9) 0.52
All 765,431 (100) 81,021 (100) 0.11 3,023,201 (100) 1,327,493 (100) 0.44
Notes: The universe in column (1) consists of all non-financial firm-year observations in the VWH data, including
incorporated and non-incorporated businesses. The matched VWH-AIDA dataset of column (2) includes firm-year
observations for incorporated businesses with an annual turnover larger than 500,000 euros that have financial information
in AIDA. Firms owned by holding companies are excluded from matched VWH-AIDA data.
TABLE A2
Effect of alternative treatment of outliers
Baseline model: Winsorize Winsorize
trim top/bottom 1% top/bottom 1% top/bottom 2%
(1) (2) (3)
1. Value added per worker 0.142 0.130 0.131
(0.061) (0.053) (0.054)
2. Capital stock per worker −0.016 −0.015 −0.015
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
3. Alternative wage 0.098 0.015 0.018
(0.026) (0.022) (0.021)
4. Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
5. Number of observations 1,327,493 1,349,358 1,349,358
6. First-stage F-statistic 28.5 39.1 41.0
Addendum
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. rents 0.044 0.041 0.042
Ratio of estimated coefficients— 0.116 0.116 0.114
row 2 ÷ row 1 (abs. value) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is log of average daily wage. Models include a complete set of job-spell dummies
as well as year effects and the covariates described in Table 2 that vary within-job spells. Value-added per worker is treated
as endogenous. Instrument is revenue per worker for firms in the same four-digit industry in the same year in other regions
of Italy.Alternative wage is weighted average of sectoral minimum wages. Standard errors clustered by four-digit industry
in parentheses.
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TABLE A3
Effects of including part-time and part-year workers
Include part-time Include part-time and
workers part-year workers
(1) (2)
1. Value added per worker 0.170 0.187
(0.069) (0.077)
2. Capital stock per worker −0.017 −0.017
(0.009) (0.009)
3. Alternative wage 0.058 0.063
(0.018) (0.026)
4. Additional controls Yes Yes
5. Number of observations 1,410,740 1,652,653
6. First-stage F-statistic 28.6 26.3
Addendum
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. rents 0.051 0.056
Ratio of estimated coefficients— 0.099 0.093
row 2 ÷ row 1 (abs. value) (0.021) (0.020)
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is log of average daily wage. All models include a complete set of job-spell
dummies as well as year effects and the covariates described in Table 2 that vary within-job spells. Value-added per worker
is treated as endogenous. Instrument is revenue per worker for firms in the same four-digit industry in the same year in
other regions of Italy. Alternative wage is weighted average of sectoral minimum wages. Model in column 1 includes
dummy for part-time workers. Model in column 2 include dummies for part-time and part-year workers. Standard errors
clustered by four-digit industry in parentheses.
TABLE A4
Effects of alternative functional form and controls for firm size
Baseline model: Alternative: Baseline Baseline model
VA/L and K/L use log(VA/L) model but but drop cluster
linear; controls and drop controls firms in industrial
for firm size log(K/L) for firm size districts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Value added per worker 0.142 – 0.135 0.135
(0.061) (0.070) (0.066)
2. Log (value added per worker) (coefficient × 10) – 0.884 – –
(0.352)
3. Capital stock per worker −0.016 – −0.036 −0.016
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008)
4. Log (capital per worker) (coefficient × 10) – −0.087 – –
(0.039)
5. Alternative wage 0.098 0.053 0.099 0.063
(0.026) (0.017) (0.027) (0.016)
6. Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
7. Number of person-year observations 1,327,493 1,291,009 1,327,493 1,161,897
8. First-stage F-statistic 28.5 30.5 24.7 24.0
Addendum
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. rents 0.044 0.045 0.042 0.042
Average derivative of log wage w.r.t. 0.142 0.179 0.135 0.135
value added per worker
Average derivative of log wage w.r.t. −0.016 −0.019 −0.036 −0.016
capital per worker
Ratio of estimated derivatives— 0.116 0.109 0.264 0.121
capital per worker/value added per worker (0.022) (0.019) (0.056) (0.022)
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is log of average daily wage. All models include a complete set of job-spell
dummies as well as year effects and the covariates described in Table 2 that vary within-job spells (except in column 3,
controls for log firm size and its square are dropped). Value-added per worker is treated as endogenous. Instrument is
revenue per worker for firms in the same four-digit industry in the same year in other regions of Italy. Alternative wage
is weighted average of sectoral minimum wages. In column 4, observations for firms in the most prevalent industry in
industrial districts are dropped. Standard errors clustered by four-digit industry in parentheses.
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TABLE A5
Effects of using perpetual-inventory-based capital stock
Baseline model: Estimated capital stock using
book value of capital investment and depreciation
(1) (2)
1. Value added per worker 0.142 0.145
(0.061) (0.062)
2. Capital stock per worker −0.016 −0.014
(0.008) (0.007)
3. Alternative wage 0.098 0.113
(0.026) (0.040)
4. Additional controls Yes Yes
5. Number of observations 1,327,493 967,739
6. First-stage F-statistic 28.5 25.3
Addendum
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. rents 0.044 0.047
Ratio of estimated coefficients— 0.116 0.097
row 2 ÷ row 1 (abs. value) (0.022) (0.027)
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is log of average daily wage. All models include a complete set of job-spell
dummies as well as year effects and the covariates described in Table 2 that vary within-job spells. Value-added per
worker is treated as endogenous. Instrument is revenue per worker for firms in the same four-digit industry in the same
year in other regions of Italy. In column 2, capital stock is calculated by authors using perpetual inventory method for
firms observed continuously from 1995 to 2001 only. Alternative wage is weighted average of sectoral minimum wages.
Standard errors clustered by four-digit industry in parentheses.
TABLE A6
IV within-spell estimates of rent sharing model for different sectors
Manufacturing versus other industries
Manufacturing
Non-
All Higher K/L Lower K/L manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Value added per worker 0.132 0.148 0.076 0.209
(0.063) (0.070) (0.120) (0.156)
2. Capital stock per worker −0.014 −0.016 0.005 −0.027
(0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.018)
3. Alternative wage (sectoral minimum) 0.085 0.066 0.198 0.046
(0.043) (0.042) (0.056) (0.021)
4. Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
5. Number of person-year observations 1,006,743 755,077 251,666 320,750
6. First-stage F-statistic value added per worker 30.2 23.0 24.1 8.6
Addendum
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. rents 0.041 0.049 0.019 0.065
Ratio of estimated coefficients— 0.106 0.110 −0.072 0.131
row 2 ÷ row 1 (abs. value) (0.030) (0.028) (0.363) (0.029)
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is log of average daily wage. Models include a complete set of job-spell dummies
as well as year effects and the covariates described in Table 2 that vary within-job spells. Value-added per worker is treated
as endogenous. Instrument is revenue per worker for firms in the same four-digit industry in the same year in other regions
of Italy. Alternative wage is weighted average of sectoral minimum wages. Manufacturing firms are classified as having
high or low capital per worker (K/L) if their ratio of capital per worker is above or below the 25th percentile for all
manufacturing firms. Standard errors clustered by four-digit industry in parentheses.
[15:13 24/9/2013 rdt030.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 26 1–28
26 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
TABLE A7
Estimated rent sharing models by gender and occupation group
By gender By major occupation group
Males Females Blue collar White collar
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Value added per worker 0.121 0.167 0.194 0.118
(0.055) (0.106) (0.082) (0.055)
2. Capital stock per worker −0.014 −0.020 −0.021 −0.013
(0.007) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008)
3. Alternative wage 0.054 0.098 0.058 0.003
(0.016) (0.021) (0.014) (0.023)
4. Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
5. Number of person-year observations 997,364 330,129 924,301 403,192
6. First-stage F-statistic 25.6 31.8 29.3 18.5
Addendum
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. rents 0.037 0.052 0.060 0.037
Ratio of estimated coefficients— 0.114 0.119 0.110 0.111
row 2 ÷ row 1 (abs. value) (0.027) (0.021) (0.019) (0.034)
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is log of average daily wage. Models include a complete set of job-spell dummies
as well as year effects and the covariates described in Table 2 that vary within-job spells. Value-added per worker is treated
as endogenous. Instrument is revenue per worker for firms in the same four digit industry in the same year in other regions
of Italy.Alternative wage is weighted average of sectoral minimum wages. Standard errors clustered by four-digit industry
in parentheses.
TABLE A8
Estimated rent sharing models for high and low debt firms
Overall sample Lower-debt firms Higher-debt firms
(1) (2) (3)
1. Value added per worker 0.142 0.171 0.105
(0.061) (0.075) (0.083)
2. Capital stock per worker −0.016 −0.018 −0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
3. Alternative wage 0.098 0.064 0.069
(0.026) (0.018) (0.022)
4. Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
5. Number of observations 1,327,493 659,930 667,563
6. First-stage F-statistic 28.5 22.0 11.1
Addendum
Elasticity of wages w.r.t. rents 0.044 0.053 0.033
Ratio of estimated coefficients— 0.116 0.103 0.130
row 2 ÷ row 1 (abs. value) (0.022) (0.027) (0.035)
Notes: Dependent variable in all models is log of average daily wage. All models include a complete set of job-spell
dummies as well as year effects and the covariates described in Table 2 that vary within-job spells. Value-added per
worker is treated as endogenous. Instrument is revenue per worker for firms in the same four-digit industry in the same
year in other regions of Italy. Alternative wage is weighted average of sectoral minimum wages. Standard errors clustered
by four-digit industry in parentheses.
[15:13 24/9/2013 rdt030.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 27 1–28
CARD ET AL. RENT-SHARING, HOLDUP, AND WAGES 27
Acknowledgments. We thank the editor and two anonymous referees for extensive comments that substantially
improved the paper. We also thank Raj Chetty, Carlo Gianelle, Peter Kuhn, Alex Lefter, Bentley MacLeod, Enrico
Moretti, Luigi Pistaferri, Ben Sand, and numerous seminar participants for comments and suggestions. We are especially
grateful to Giuseppe Tattara for providing the Veneto Work History Data, and to Carlo Gianelle and Marco Valentini for
their help in using these data. Agata Maida received support for this research from a grant from the Leibniz Association
to RWI Essen.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at Review of Economic Studies online.
REFERENCES
ABOWD, J.M. and LEMIEUX, T. (1993), “The Effects of Product Market Competition on Collective Bargaining
Agreements: The Case of Foreign Competition in Canada”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 983–1014.
ADDISON, J.T., SCHANK, T., SCHNABEL, C. and WAGNER. J. (2007), “Do Works Councils Inhibit Investment?”
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 60, 187–203.
ARACHI, G. and BIAGI, F. (2005), “Taxation, Cost of Capital, and Investment: Do Tax Asymmetries Matter?” Giornale
degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 64, 295–322.
ARAI, M. (2003), “Wages, Profitability and Capital Intensity: Evidence from Matched Worker-Firm Data”, Journal of
Labor Economics, 21, 593–618.
ARAI, M. and HEYMAN, F. (2009), “Microdata Evidence on Rent-Sharing”, Applied Economics, 41, 2965–2976.
BALDWIN, C. (1983), “Productivity and Labor Unions: An Application of the Theory of Self-Enforcing Contracts”,
Journal of Business, 56, 155–186.
BARTOLUCCI, C. and DEVICIENTI, F. (2012), “Better Workers Move to Better Firms: A Simple Test to Identify
Sorting”, Carlo Alberto Notebooks Number, 259.
BENFRATELLO L., MARGON, D., RONDI, L., SEMBENELLI, A., VANNONI, D., ZELLI, S. and ZITTINO, M.
(2001), “The New Ceris Panel On Italian Firms 1977–1997” (CERIS-CNR Working Paper Number 5–2001).
BLANCHFLOWER, D.G., OSWALD,A.J. and SANFEY, P. (1996), “Wages, Profits and Rent-sharing”, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 111, 227–251.
DE BLASIO, G. and DIADDARIO, S. (2005), “Do Workers Benefit from IndustrialAgglomeration?” Journal of Regional
Science, 45, 797–827.
BOARI, C. (2001), Industrial Clusters, Focal Firms, and Economic Dynamism: A Perspective from Italy (Washington
DC: World Bank).
BRONARS, S.G. and DEERE, D.R. (1993), “Unionization, Incomplete Contracting, and Capital Investment”, Journal
of Business, 66, 117–32.
CARD, D., DEVICIENTI, F. and MAIDA, A. (2010), “Rent-sharing, Holdup and Wages: Evidence from Matched Panel
Data” (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Number 16192).
CARDULLO, G., CONTI, M. and SULIS, G. (2013), “Sunk Capital, Unions and the Holdup Problem: Theory and
Evidence from Sectoral Data” (Unpublished Working Paper, Department of Economics University of Genova).
CASADIO P. (2003), “Wage Formation in the Italian Private Sector After the 1992–93 Income Policy Agreements”, in
G. Fagan, Mongelli, F.P. and Morgan, J. (eds), Institutions and Wage Formation in the New Europe (Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar) 112–33.
CELLA, G.P. and TREU, T. (2009), Relazioni Industriali e Contrattazione Collettiva (Bologna: Il Mulino).
CHE, Y.-K. and SAKOVICS, J. (2008), “Holdup Problem”, in Durlauf, S.N. and Blume, L.E. (eds), The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edn. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
CHRISTOFIDES, L.N. and OSWALD,A.J. (1992), “Real Wage Determination and Rent-sharing in Collective Bargaining
Agreements”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 985–1002.
CONNOLLY, R.A., HIRSCH, B.T. and HIRSCHEY, M. (1986), “Union Rent Seeking, Intangible Capital, and Market
Value of the Firm”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 68, 567–577.
CRAWFORD, V.F. (1988), “Long-Term Relationships Governed by Short-Term Contracts”, American Economic Review,
78, 485–499.
DASGUPTA, S. and SENGUPTA, K. (1993), “Sunk Investment, Bargaining, and the Choice of Capital Structure”,
International Economic Review, 34, 203–220.
DELL’ARINGA, C. and LUCIFORA, C. (1994), “Collective Bargaining and Relative Earnings in Italy”, European
Journal of Political Economy, 10, 727–47.
DENNY, K. and NICKELL, S.J. (1992), “Unions and Investment in British Manufacturing Industry”, British Journal of
Industrial Relations, 29, 113–121.
DICKENS, W.T. and KATZ, L.F. (1987), “Inter-Industry Wage Differences and Theories of Wage Determination” National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Number 2014.
ELSTON, J.A. and RONDI, L. (2006), “Shareholder Protection and the Cost of Capital: Empirical Evidence from German
and Italian Firms”, (CERIS-CNR Working Paper No. 8). (Moncalieri (Italy): CERIS-CNR).
FARBER, H. (1986), “The Analysis of Union Behavior”, in Ashenfelter, O. and Layard, R. (eds), Handbook of Labor
Economics, Vol. 2. (Amsterdam: North Holland).
[15:13 24/9/2013 rdt030.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 28 1–28
28 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
FRANZOSI, A.M. (2008), “Costo del Capitale e Struttura Finanziaria: Valutazione degli effetti di IRAP e DIT” (Istituto
per la Ricerca Sociale (Milano) Unpublished Working Paper).
GAIOTTI E. and GENERALE, A. (2001), “Does Monetary Policy Have Symmetric Effects? A Look at the Investment
Decisions of Italian Firms” (Temi di Discussione No. 429). (Roma: Bank of Italy).
GENNARI, E., MAURIZI, G. and STADERINI, A. (2005), “Estimating the Reactivity of Investment to Tax Changes:
The Case of Italy in the Nineties”, Politica Economica, 3, 435–460.
GROUT, P.A. (1984), “Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach”,
Econometrica, 52, 449–460.
GUISO, L., PISTAFERRI, L. and SCHIVARDI, F. (2005), “Insurance within the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy,
113, 1054–1087.
GUERTZGEN, N. (2009), “Rent-Sharing and Collective Bargaining Coverage: Evidence from Linked Employer-
Employee Data”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 111, 323–349.
HILDRETH, A.K.G. and OSWALD, A.J. (1997), “Rent-sharing and Wages: Evidence from Company and Establishment
Panels”, Journal of Labor Economics, 15, 318–337.
HIRSCH, B.T. (2004), “What Do Unions Do For Economic Performance?”, Journal of Labor Research, 25, 417–455.
ISTAT (2000), “La Flessibilità del Mercato del Lavoro nel Periodo 1995–96”, Informazioni, 34.
MACHIN, S. and WADHWANI, S. (1991). “The Effects of Unions on Investment and Innovation: Evidence From WIRS”,
Economic Journal, 101, 324–330.
MACLEOD, W.B. (2010), “Great Expectations: Law, Employment Contracts, and Labor Market Performance”, in
Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 4. (New York: Elsevier).
MARGOLIS, D.N. and SALVANES, K.G. (2001), “Do Firms Really Share Rents with Their Workers?” (IZA Discussion
Paper No. 330). (Bonn: IZA).
MARIOTTI, I. and MONTAGNANA, S. (2008), “Italian Investments in the Agglomeration of Timisoara in Romania:
Threat or Opportunity for Economic Development?”, Romanian Journal of Regional Science, 2, 33–52.
MARTINS, P. (2009), “Rent-sharing Before and After the Wage Bill”, Applied Economics, 41, 2133–2151.
MENEZES-FILHO, N.A. and VAN REENEN, J. (2003), “Unions and Innovation: A Survey of the Theory and Empirical
Evidence”, (Center for Economic Policy Research Working Paper No. 3792). (London: CEPR).
MENEZES-FILHO, N.A., ULPH, D.T. and VAN REENEN, J. (1998), “The Impact of Unions on R&D: Empirical
Evidence”, European Economic Review, 42, 919–930.
NICKELL, S.J. andWADHWANI, S. (1990), “Insider Forces andWage Determination”, Economic Journal, 100, 496–509.
ODGERS, C.W. and BETTS, J.R. (1997), “Do Unions Reduce Investment? Evidence from Canada”, Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, 51, 18–36.
SIMONS, H. (1944), “Some Reflections on Syndicalism”, Journal of Political Economy, 52, 1–25.
SCHIVARDI, F. and TORRINI, R. (2008), “Identifying the Effects of Firing Restrictions through Size-contingent
Differences in Regulation”, Labor Economics, 15, 482–511.
SLICHTER, S. (1950), “Notes on the Structure of Wages”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 32, 80–91.
SMITH, A. (1976), An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
SUBRAMANIAM, V. (1996), “Underinvestment, Debt Financing, and Long-Term Supplier Relations”, Journal of Law,
Economics and Organizations, 12, 461–475.
TATTARA, G. and VALENTINI, M. (2007). “The Cyclical Behavior of Job and Worker Flows” (Working Paper No. 16.
Department of Economics Ca’ Foscari University of Venice).
ULPH,A.M. and ULPH, D.T. (1989). “Labor Markets and Innovation”, Journal of Japanese and International Economics,
3, 403–423.
ULPH, A.M. and ULPH, D.T. (1994), “Labor Markets and Innovation: Ex-post Bargaining”, European Economic Review,
38, 195–210.
USMAN, M. (2004), “Optimal Debt Contracts with Renegotiation”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,
13, 755–776.
VAN REENEN, J. (1996), “The Creation and Capture of Economic Rents: Wages and Innovation in a Panel of UK
Companies”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 195–226.
WOOLDRIDGE, J.M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (Cambridge MA: MIT Press).
